Our study provides evidence that security design reflects the interplay of supplier and issuer preferences. While call provisions have historically been the default option in convertible security design, we find that only a minority of post-2005 issues are callable. Because hedge funds dominate the market for new convertibles today and convertible arbitrage is less risky without callability, the diminution in callability emphasizes the importance of the preferences of the suppliers of capital in determining security design. We show that further determinants of callability include rationales for issuing convertibles that emphasize issuer preferences.
Introduction
Many studies have considered optimal security design from the viewpoint of the issuer. It has been argued that issuers design securities to minimize costs associated with agency problems (Harris and Raviv, 1989) , with information asymmetries (Duffie and Rahi, 1995) , and with financial distress, regulation and taxation (Miller, 1986; Myers, 2001 ). Alternatively, several recent studies of corporate financial decisions have taken the viewpoint of the supplier of capital. Baker (2009) reviews the evidence that supplier preferences are a determinant of corporate financial decisions and identifies supplier-driven security design as an important topic for future research in corporate finance.
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Our paper investigates the importance of supplier-driven security design and we do so by addressing the interplay of both supplier and issuer preferences. We examine a market that has witnessed a major shift in the suppliers of capital, namely the market for convertible securities.
The convertible market is especially interesting as the shift in the supply side is observable and because the shift has been towards convertible arbitrage hedge funds, which have particular design preferences. Importantly, the issuer and the hedge fund perspectives can differ substantially on the question of whether or not to include a call provision.
2 Consequently, we focus on the fluctuating popularity of convertible call provisions to examine the interplay of supplier and issuer preferences in the design of securities.
1 Papers that examine the effect of supplier preferences on corporate financial decisions include Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2009) . Baker and Wurgler (2004) find that firms are more likely to pay dividends in times of increased investor preferences for dividend-paying firms. Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2009) show that managers supply shares at lower price levels when investors place higher valuations on low-price firms.
2 A call provision allows the issuer to redeem the convertible before its maturity. Upon calling, the holder of the convertible is forced to choose between the call price and converting the convertible bond into a specified number of shares.
Traditional rationales for why firms issue convertibles take the issuer's perspective and assign substantial importance to call provisions. These models were developed at a time when call provisions were the norm. The information asymmetry rationale of Stein (1992) posits that high-quality firms issue debt, low-quality firms issue equity, and medium-quality firms issue convertibles. Call provisions are important in Stein's backdoor equity rationale for convertible issuance since they allow a firm to force conversion once the share price has risen. In Mayers (1998) , convertibles are issued for sequential financing purposes and call provisions are important as they allow firms to reduce their leverage by forcing conversion if the sequential investment option proves valuable.
From an issuer's perspective, the inclusion of call provisions in both convertible and straight debt has also been explained as a reflection of agency problems (Bodie and Taggart, 1978; Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; Robbins and Schatzberg, 1986) , bond issuers' desire to hedge against decreases in interest rates (Bowlin, 1966; Pye, 1966) , and a means of avoiding hold-up problems by removing undesired covenants that restrict merger activity (Smith and Warner, 1979) . Now consider the preferences of the suppliers of capital. The principal buyers of convertibles today are hedge funds. 3 Hedge funds combine the purchase of a convertible with a short position in the firm's stock. Convertible arbitrage hedge funds are less attracted to callable convertibles (Woodson, 2002) since an unanticipated call redistributes wealth from the holders of convertibles to stockholders. Such a redistribution is not a hedgeable comovement of the bond and stock. In the event of a call, convertible arbitrage hedge funds lose both on their long position in the convertible and on their short position in the issuer's stock. 
. 4 Our focus on call provisions is unique. Prior work on convertible arbitrage has focused on the relation of convertible arbitrage to security mispricing (Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino, 2007) , stock market Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) We document a negative relation between the size of the convertible arbitrage industry and the probability that a newly-issued convertible is callable. We also examine the impact of the private placement market for convertibles on the likelihood of incorporating a call provision. 5 Privately placing a security allows issuers and buyers to directly negotiate the design of the security and private placements have been particularly popular with convertible arbitrage hedge funds (Brown et al., 2012; Berkman, McKenzie and Verwijmeren, 2016) .
Consistent with the preferences of hedge funds, privately-placed convertibles are significantly less likely to include call provisions than are publicly-issued convertibles. As an additional test, we collect hedge fund involvement in specific convertible issues and confirm the negative relation between hedge fund involvement and the probability that an issue is callable.
We further document that the 21 st century's reduction in the popularity of call provisions in new convertible issues is not simply a mirror of a similar diminution in the likelihood that liquidity (Choi, Getmansky and Tookes, 2009 ), issue volume (Choi et al., 2010; De Jong, Duca and Dutordoir, 2013) , stock repurchases (De Jong, Dutordoir and Verwijmeren, 2011) , the announcement effects of an issue (Duca et al., 2012) , and the cost of raising capital (Brown et al., 2012) . new straight debt issues will be callable. Although many theoretical rationales for including call provisions apply to both convertibles and straight debt, the straight debt market is not dominated by hedge funds.
Our results establish the importance of the supply side of capital for security design, and are the first to document the diminution in the popularity of convertible call provisions. A further important contribution of our study is that the recent diminution in the popularity of call provisions in convertible debt has provided sufficient cross-sectional variation to allow us to analyze the demand-side determinants of call provisions in convertible securities. This was not possible when call provisions were the default. We find evidence that in addition to the preferences of convertible arbitrageurs, other significant determinants of the inclusion of call provisions are the potential for reducing problems associated with information asymmetries, sequential financing, and incentives to reduce a hold-up problem.
The reduced likelihood that a convertible will contain a call provision has potential implications for some of the extant rationales advanced for issuing convertibles. In particular, the backdoor equity rationale of Stein (1992) and the sequential financing rationale of Mayers (1998) both assume that the convertible is callable. 6 The recent diminution in the likelihood that a convertible will contain a call provision does not imply that the backdoor equity and sequential investment opportunities rationales for convertible bond issuance are unimportant.
Rather, short-term non-callable debt maturing after the resolution of an information asymmetry 6 Other rationales for issuing convertibles are that convertibles can reduce risk-shifting incentives (Green, 1984) ; reduce the sensitivity of the value of a new debt issue to a change in the risk of the issuer's activities (Brennan and Kraus, 1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 1988) ; allow financing in the presence of an information asymmetry (Constantinides and Grundy, 1986) ; and provide the least-cost financing opportunity for firms with relatively high costs of issuing seasoned equity (Brown et al., 2012) . The models of Green (1984) , Brennan and Kraus (1987) , Brennan and Schwartz (1988) , Constantinides and Grundy (1986) , and Brown et al. (2012) do not rely on the convertible being callable.
or the resolution of uncertainty surrounding an investment opportunity can be a substitute for callable long-term debt (Robbins and Schatzberg, 1986) . We document that the average maturity of convertible bonds has been relatively short since the early 1990s, which reduces the need for call provisions in the rationales of Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the growth of the convertible hedge fund industry and hedge fund preferences for non-callable versus callable convertibles.
Section 3 describes the data and time trends in the callability of new issues of convertibles.
Section 4 considers the traditional set of rationales for the inclusion of call provisions in both convertible and straight debt. Section 5 undertakes a logit analysis of convertible bond callability based on both the traditionally posited determinants of callability and the size of the convertible hedge fund industry. Section 6 investigates the implications of our findings for the backdoor equity and sequential financing rationales for issuing convertible bonds and Section 7 concludes.
The rise of convertible arbitrage hedge funds
The decision to call a convertible bond rests with the issuing firm and redistributes wealth between convertibleholders and stockholders. An unanticipated call will result in a convertible hedge fund losing on both its long position (in the convertible) and its short position (in the common stock of the bond issuer). Calamos (2003) , a practitioner text, observes that convertible arbitrage strategies are easier to implement when a convertible is not callable. The uncertainty introduced by a call provision complicates hedging by making it more difficult to determine the optimal number of shares to short and complicates the detection of arbitrage opportunities due to the additional knowledge of the firm's call policy that is needed when valuing the convertible. Similarly, Woodson (2002) argues that (p. 131) "the hedge arbitrageur does not want to be exposed to the risk of forced conversion." [ please insert Figure 1 
The changing frequency of convertible call provisions through time
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the popularity of convertible bond call provisions over [ please insert Figure 2 here ]
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the percentage of convertible securities that can be called in the first three years of the bond's life. This measure is the more relevant one for convertible arbitrage hedge fund buyers since hedge funds typically only hold the convertibles 8 The exclusion of these issues does not affect our conclusions. (2010) were subsequently held by the purchasing hedge fund for 6.5 months (14.6 months).
Less than ten percent of the purchasing hedge funds still had a position in the convertible after three years. Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) document that although a period of call protection was not uncommon for convertibles issued between 1980 and 1996, the majority of convertibles were callable in the first three years of their life. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that in the last decade of our sample period (ending in 2013), only 18.8% of new convertibles issues are callable within three years of issuance. The dramatic decline in the likelihood that new convertible bond issues are callable and in the likelihood that, if a new convertible is callable, it is callable during the first three years of its life is consistent with the preferences of convertible arbitrage hedge funds.
Traditional determinants of the incorporation of call provisions
Prior studies on whether to include call provisions have largely focused on straight debt.
This section considers the factors identified in these studies and their potential importance as variables in our analysis of the call provisions in convertible bonds. Bowlin (1966) and Pye (1966) argue that interest rate variability is one important determinant of whether a bond will be callable. A call provision allows the issuing firm to refinance its debt if interest rates fall and hence the inclusion of a call provision can be viewed as optimal when the firm's managers predict a higher likelihood of a decline in interest rates than is predicted by buyers of the firm's debt. If this disparity in predictions is larger when interest rates are higher, then call provisions will be more common when interest rates are high. Kish and Livingston (1992) and Banko and Zhou (2010) conclude that higher interest rates at the time of issue increases the probability that a straight debt issue will include a call provision.
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The Kish and Livingston (1992) and Banko and Zhou (2010) studies also report that the percentage of below investment-grade bonds issued in a year is related to the popularity of call provisions in new issues of straight debt. The authors argue that below investment-grade bond issuers are more likely to use call provisions to alleviate the more severe agency problems they face, as described in Bodie and Taggart (1978) , Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) , and Robbins and Schatzberg (1986) . Managers might have private information on improvements in general credit conditions or firm-specific credit quality. Since there is more room for improvement for firms whose current ratings are poor, below investment-grade issues may be more likely to include call provisions. Crabbe and Helwege (1994) report that nearly all below investment-grade straight bonds are callable, while fewer than 30% of investment-grade straight bonds are callable.
Additional explanations for call provisions considered in the straight debt literature include reductions of hold-up problems (Smith and Warner, 1979) and costs related to information asymmetry (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; Robbins and Schatzberg, 1986) .
decline in the incorporation of call provisions in the design of convertibles will not be mirrored by a similar decline for straight bonds.
We obtain data on the popularity of call provisions in straight debt from Mergent FISD.
From the straight debt issues in the U.S. market between 1985 and mid-2013, we delete issues by government and agency institutions as well as issues by banks and utilities, and observations with missing SIC codes. The resultant sample consists of 25,590 issues. At any point in time straight and convertible debt issues face the same interest rate environment. Hence, changes in rates cannot explain the difference in the patterns in Figure 3 .
The difference in the patterns might potentially be explained by a time-varying difference between the proportion of straight debt issues that are below investment-grade and the proportion of convertible issues that are below investment-grade; e.g., the proportion of straight debt issues that were below investment-grade increased after 1990 (as Banko and Zhou (2010) observe) while the proportion of convertible issues that were below investment-grade declined dramatically after 2000. This, however, is not the case for convertible issues. The average fraction of rated convertibles with below investment-grade ratings issued over the years 1985 through 1999 inclusive is 75.15%. The post-1999 average is 77.62%. Hence, the set of convertible bonds issued after 1-1-2000 are not more likely to receive an investment-grade rating than the set issued before 1-1-2000.
In addition, we document that the post-1999 decline in the proportion of convertible issues that are callable within three years of issuance occurred for both investment-grade and below investment-grade convertibles. For the set of below investment-grade convertibles, 
Logit analysis of call provisions in convertible bond issues
The reduction in the popularity of call provisions in the design of convertible bonds allows us to examine the determinants of whether a particular issue is callable. This was not possible when call provisions were the effective default. In this section, we report evidence that not only are the size of the convertible arbitrage industry and the fraction of an issue purchased by convertible arbitrageurs significant determinants of whether a convertible issue is callable, but proxies for information asymmetries, sequential financing, and potential hold-up problems also help explain whether a convertible is callable.
The dependent variable in our analysis is a dummy equal to one if the issue is callable within the first three years of its life. This measure of callability is of most relevance for hedge funds, as the large majority of convertible arbitrage hedge funds (93%) have closed their position within three years (Van Marle and Verwijmeren, 2016) . The independent variables are a measure of the size of the convertible arbitrage industry, whether the convertible bond was a Rule 144A private placement, and a set of variables related to traditional rationales for including call provisions in convertible and/or straight debt issues. Table I reports descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis.
Variables related to convertible arbitrage
We 13 12 We also classify a hedge fund in these databases as a convertible arbitrageur when the self-reported description of the hedge fund's strategy makes it clear that convertible arbitrage is an important part of the fund's strategy. We examine end-of-year assets under management because a substantial number of hedge funds do not report their assets under management on a monthly or quarterly basis. We avoid double-counting when calculating the aggregate end-of-year assets under management for hedge funds in Lipper TASS and HFR. 13 The aggregate size of the convertible arbitrage industry that we report exceeds the size reported by [ please insert Table I and Figure 4 here ] Table I reports that 48% of our sample of convertibles are privately placed in the 144A market. Securities issued under Rule 144A do not require registration with the SEC but can be traded without restriction in the secondary market among qualified institutional buyers. 14 The private placement market is interesting since potential buyers can influence security design through direct negotiation with the would-be issuer. Brown et al. (2012) note that hedge funds are especially active in the 144A market (see also Berkman, McKenzie and Verwijmeren, 2016) . If the preferences of hedge funds are an important determinant of the design of convertible bonds today, then we predict that 144A issues have a lower likelihood of being callable within three years of issuance.
Variables unrelated to convertible arbitrage
Call provisions in the Stein (1992) model of convertible bond issuance and the Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) and Robbins and Schatzberg (1986) models of straight debt issuance arise because of asymmetric information between managers and investors. We use two variables to capture the level of information asymmetry. First, we include the size of the issuer as measured by total sales at the year-end before the issue following Frank and Goyal (2003) and Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) , who argue that information asymmetries will be largest for small firms. The mean (median) sales by the issuers of our convertibles in the year prior to issue are $2426 ($560) million. Our second proxy for the level of information asymmetry is whether the issue is shelf registered. Shelf registration allows a firm to issue securities to the public without a separate convertible arbitrage hedge funds that report in HFR. A comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 4 shows that the overall pattern is similar across both studies.
prospectus for each issue and can be used by well-known seasoned issuers (WKSIs), defined by Securities Act Rule 405 as companies that have filed all annual and quarterly reports in a timely manner and that have a market capitalization of at least $700 million, or have issued at least $1 billion in registered debt offerings over the past three years. Firms that are able to issue securities via shelf registration are expected to be firms with relatively low informational asymmetry. Table I reports that 17.31% of our sample are issued via a shelf registration. Mayers (1998) argues that financing with callable convertibles can be optimal for firms requiring sequential rounds of financing. We use a firm's capex in the financial year before the issue scaled by total assets at the end of that prior year as a proxy for a firm's likely continuing financing requirements. The mean (median) prior year capex by the issuers of our convertibles is seven percent (four percent) of year-end total assets.
Interestingly, shelf registration, which we interpret as a proxy for information asymmetry, facilitates multiple financing rounds. As such, the sequential financing rationale would predict that shelf registrations are more likely to contain call provisions, whereas the information asymmetry rationale predicts that shelf registrations are less likely to contain call provisions. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that call provisions can facilitate the removal of restrictive covenants, for example in the case of a merger. We measure the perceived relevance of future takeovers at the time the security is designed by examining whether the security contains a poison put provision. Poison puts are relevant when there are potential takeovers since they allow the holders of a bond to sell it back to the issuer at a pre-specified price in the event of a change of control (Nanda and Yun, 1996) . If the hold-up problem is important, then we predict that issues with poison put provisions, which reflect a heightened probability of a future takeover, will also include call provisions. 15 Poison puts are contained in 44.7% of our sample.
Our analysis also includes the 10-year Treasury rate in the month of issue, whether the issue is investment-grade or below investment-grade, the number of years to maturity at the time of issue, and the offering proceeds. The majority of the convertibles in our sample are unrated, 10.57% have an investment-grade rating, and 30.74% are below investment-grade.
The median number of years to maturity is nine and the median offering proceeds are $150 million. [ please insert Table II here ] 15 Ex post, upon the actual change of control, only poison put provisions (to protect convertible bondholders) or call provisions (to protect equityholders by reducing holdup problems) may be required. Ex ante, when the specifics of a potential merger are unknown, a heightened probability of a takeover is likely to increase the probability of both call and poison put provisions being included in a convertible security's design.
Univariate analysis of the determinants of convertible call provisions

Logit analysis of the frequency of call provisions and the size of the convertible arbitrage industry
We use a logit model to examine the relation between the likelihood that a convertible is callable within three years of issuance and the size of the convertible arbitrage industry (measured at the year-end prior to the issue), whether the convertible was privately placed, a set of variables related to traditional rationales for including call provisions in debt issues, and industry fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification.
16 Table III reports the results of the logit analysis with standard errors clustered at the issuer level.
[ please insert Table III here ]
The size of the convertible arbitrage hedge fund industry allows us to isolate an important and observable measure of capital supply in the convertible market. We find strong support for the influence of hedge funds, and for the importance of the 144A dummy. Model 1 shows that the size of the convertible arbitrage hedge fund industry is negatively related to the probability that a convertible can be called in the first three years. Privately-placed convertibles are also significantly less likely to be callable within three years. Both these results are in line with a strong influence of the supply side of capital on convertible security design.
In Model 1, a higher Treasury rate at the time of issue increases the probability that a convertible will be callable. An issue's rating does not have a significant effect on its callability.
The maturity of the convertible is an important control variable. Convertibles with longer maturities tend to have longer call protection periods and are thus less likely to be callable within three years of issuance.
Model 2 of Table III includes additional issue and issuer variables: whether the issue was shelf registered; whether the issue contained a poison put provision; the natural log of the issuer's total sales; and the issuer's capital expenditures as a percent of its total assets. These additional variables require information from Compustat and hence the sample size is reduced from 2479 to 1853. We find that convertibles with a poison put provision are significantly more likely to be callable. Since a poison put provision is indicative of an increased perceived likelihood of a future change in control, we interpret this as evidence in favor of the hold-up rationale. We also find that smaller firms are more likely to issue callable convertibles. This is consistent with the backdoor equity rationale, which argues that settings with high information asymmetries are more likely to involve the issue of callable convertibles. Additionally, in line with the sequential financing rationale, firms with higher investment needs are more likely to issue callable convertibles.
The shelf registration variable has a negative coefficient, but is not statistically significant. Since firms that are able to issue securities via shelf registration are expected to have relatively low informational asymmetry, the negative coefficient is in line with the backdoor equity rationale. The strength of the relation may be reduced by the sequential financing rationale since shelf registration facilitates multiple financing rounds in which call provisions can play an important role (Mayers, 1998) .
To further examine the importance of interest rates, we examine the link between callability and the fixed versus floating-rate nature of the coupon on a convertible issue. If the firm's managers predict a higher likelihood of a decline in interest rates than is predicted by buyers of the firm's debt and this divergence of opinions is larger when interest rates are higher, then call provisions in fixed-rate convertible bond issues will be more common when interest rates are high. Such a disparity of views about interest rate variability will not though lead to the inclusion of call provisions in floating-rate issues.
Model 3 of Table III extends Model 2 of Table III by including a floating-rate dummy variable and a cross-product of the floating-rate dummy and the 10-year Treasury-rate variable.
Since the refinancing rationale for call provisions is moot when the debt pays a floating rate, we expect that the coefficient on the floating rate dummy should be negative. The estimated coefficient is indeed negative, but the effect is not statistically significant. Further, if the estimated coefficient on the 10-year Treasury rate variable is positive because the level of interest rates serves as a proxy for the importance of a disparity in issuer and purchaser predictions, then the sign of the coefficient on the cross-product term should be opposite to that on the 10-year Treasury rate variable. The observed negative coefficient of the cross-product is in line with this prediction, but this effect is also not statistically significant. Overall, the results in Model 3 are not fully in line with interest rates being an important determinant of the likelihood that a convertible will be callable within three years of issuance. [ please insert Table IV here ]
Robustness
Rather than a measure of whether a convertible is protected from a call within the first three years of its life, we can instead use as the dependent variable a simple measure of whether or not a convertible contains a call provision. Models 1 and 2 of Table V show that a larger convertible arbitrage industry is related to a reduced likelihood of a call provision. Further, as
an alternate dependent variable we can examine the number of years for which a convertible is call-protected. This examination reduces the dependence on any particular cutoff such as the three years examined in earlier sections. Models 3 and 4 of Table V report the results of a poisson regression where the dependent variable is the number of years for which the convertible is protected against a call. When the convertible is non-callable, the dependent variable is simply the bond's maturity. We find that the larger the convertible arbitrage hedge fund industry, the longer the length of call protection. The call protection period is also longer for privately-placed convertibles.
[ please insert Table V here ] In Models 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the years of call protection divided by the maturity of the bond. Our results for these models suggest that the relative call protection period is longer when the size of the convertible arbitrage industry is larger, all else equal. Privatelyplaced convertible bonds also have call protection periods that are a larger fraction of the time to maturity.
As shown in Figures 1 and 4 , convertible arbitrage hedge funds became a non-trivial supplier of convertible bond capital only after 1994; i.e., after a time when call provisions were the default option in convertible security design. We adjust the Endogeneity of the explanatory variables can have an effect on the coefficient estimates in our tables. Most notably, a firm may jointly decide on whether its convertible will be callable and the number of years to its maturity, and whether it contains a poison put, is privately placed, and/or is shelf registered. We follow Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) and Tewari, Byrd and Ramanlal (2015) and conduct endogeneity tests of the explanatory variables as described in Wooldridge (2002, Section 15.7.2) . In the first step, we regress each of the potentially endogenous variables on the exogenous variables in our model and an instrument. The exogenous variables are the preceding year's size of the convertible arbitrage industry, the Treasury rate, the issuer's rating, the offering proceeds, and the preceding year's total sales and capital expenditures. We use asset maturity as the instrument for the years to maturity (Stohs and Mauer, 1996) . We use the firm's market leverage as the instrument for poison put provisions (Nanda and Yun, 1996) . We use asset tangibility as the instrument for privately placing the security and for shelf registration (Huang and Ramirez, 2010) . The residuals from the first-step regression are included as an additional explanatory variable in the second step, in which we estimate the probability that the convertible is callable within three years of issuance. In this second step, the test statistic for the coefficient of the residual provides a test of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrumented variable. We conclude that we cannot reject this null hypothesis for any of the years to maturity, poison put provision, private 17 A second rationale for separately examining this subperiod is that Booth, Gounopoulos and Skinner (2013) respectively. As such, we do not find evidence that endogeneity is a significant concern. Brown et al. (2012) collect data on hedge fund involvement in privately-placed convertible offerings for the period 2000 through 2008 by downloading registration statements from SEC Edgar. For privately-placed issues, these registration statements contain the names of the buyers. This allows an analysis of the fraction of an issue placed with hedge funds. We follow their procedure to obtain information on hedge fund involvement in privately-placed convertible issues, but with two extensions. First, we extend the sample period to 1994 -
Logit analysis of hedge fund involvement in specific issues and the issue's callability
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. 18 Second, we use PlacementTracker as an additional source of hedge fund involvement in security offerings. On average, hedge funds buy 53% of the 853 privately-placed convertibles for which we are able to obtain the names of the buyers.
[ please insert Table VI here ] Table VI shows the relation between hedge fund involvement and the probability that a convertible is callable within the first three years of its life. We predict that issues with relatively high hedge fund involvement are less likely to be callable within three years of issuance. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative relation between the percentage of an issue purchased by hedge funds and the likelihood the issue is callable within three years.
Using hedge fund involvement in a particular issue rather than the size of the convertible arbitrage industry as the explanatory variable has the disadvantage of a smaller sample size since the measure can only be determined for privately-placed convertibles. However, the advantages of using hedge fund involvement in particular issues are that it is the cleaner measure of the explanatory variable and that the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund involvement allows us to control for year fixed effects in our regression specification. Model 3 and 4 of Table VI show that including year fixed effects does not change our conclusion that issues with relatively high hedge fund involvement are less likely to be callable within three years.
Implications for the backdoor equity and sequential financing rationales
A reduction in the popularity of convertible call provisions might seem to suggest that the backdoor equity and sequential financing models for convertible issuance have become less important. In the backdoor equity rationale of Stein (1992) , call provisions are important for convertible issuance since they allow a firm to force conversion into equity once the share price has risen. In Mayers (1998) , call provisions are important for sequential financing purposes as they allow firms to reduce their leverage by forcing conversion if the sequential investment option proves valuable. However, one should note that Stein's and Mayers' theories are applicable in a world without call provisions provided the convertibles' maturities are appropriately short. 19 In both rationales, short-term non-callable convertible debt can be a substitute for long-term callable convertible debt. We thus examine how the maturities of convertible bonds have varied through time. In our sample, maturities upon issuance were long before 1990, with a median time to maturity of 25 years. Call provisions play an important role in both the Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) rationales for including call provisions in longterm convertibles. Since the early 1990s, however, maturities upon issuance for convertible bonds have decreased substantially, to eight years for the typical convertible issued in the 1990s 19 In a world with long-term convertibles, the backdoor equity rationale for issuing a convertible could hold without call provisions if firms can induce voluntary conversion by paying sufficiently high dividends. However, Grundy and Verwijmeren (2016) show that voluntary conversion is never optimal for dividend-protected convertibles and document that dividend protection has become the default for convertible bonds.
and seven years for the typical convertible issued in the 21st century. In fact by 1995, when hedge funds started to implement convertible arbitrage, the typical maturity upon issuance had already fallen to seven years. Hence, the recent diminution in the frequency of call provisions does not imply that the Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) rationales for issuing convertibles are no longer important.
Conclusions
Consistent with the prediction of Baker (2009), we confirm the importance of the preferences of the supply side of capital for the design of financing instruments. Convertible arbitrage hedge funds prefer to invest in convertibles that are not callable in the years immediately after issuance. We document that the popularity of convertible call provisions has declined substantially since the rise of convertible arbitrage. The world has changed from one in which almost all convertibles are callable to one in which the majority of convertible issues do not contain call provisions. We conclude that the change in convertible bond security design reflects the increased size of the convertible arbitrage industry and the increasing fraction of new convertibles issues that are purchased by hedge funds. A further observation consistent with the importance of a factor applicable to the convertible market but not the market for straight debt issues, a factor such as convertible arbitrage, as an explanation for the declining frequency of call provisions in convertible securities is that there has been no contemporaneous decline in the popularity of call provisions in straight debt issues.
Our findings relate to rationales for issuing convertibles. The models in Green (1984) , Brennan and Kraus (1987) , Brennan and Schwartz (1988) , Constantinides and Grundy (1989), and Brown et al. (2012) do not rely on call provisions being included, while the rationales of Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) assign importance to call provisions. We note that the shorter maturities of more recently issued convertible bonds could substitute for call provisions in the rationales of Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) .
The diminution in the frequency of call provisions in convertible debt issues but not their complete elimination allows for sufficient variation in convertible callability to analyze the importance of a potential set of determinants of the inclusion of call provisions in convertible securities. This has not previously been possible since call provisions were the default. We find evidence that in addition to the preferences of convertible arbitrageurs, other significant determinants of the inclusion of call provisions are the potential for reducing problems associated with information asymmetries, sequential financing, and incentives to reduce a holdup problem. Our study thus provides evidence of the interplay of supplier and issuer preferences in the design of securities.
Convertible arbitrage over time Figure 1 . This figure depicts measures of convertible fund activity through time: the annual percentage of privately-placed convertible bonds that are purchased by hedge funds, from Brown et al. (2012) , reported above the columns; the end-of-year total assets of convertible arbitrage hedge funds in billions of USD, from Choi, Getmansky and Tookes (2009) , on the left axis; and the annual number of press articles in Factiva about convertible arbitrage, from Duca et al. (2012) , on the right axis. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % Hedge fund involvement (Brown et al., 2012) Size of convertible arbitrage industry in billion USD (Choi, Getmansky and Tookes, 2009) (left-axis) Number of convertible arbitrage-related articles appearing in Factiva (Duca et al., 2012) (right-axis) Percentage of convertible issues with call provisions
Percentage of convertible issues callable within three years of issuance This figure reports the annual fraction of convertibles with call provisions (top panel), and the annual fraction of convertibles that can be called within three years of issuance (bottom panel).
Our main sample consists of convertible bonds issued by U.S. industrial firms. Our restricted sample imposes the requirement that the issuer reports information in Compustat in the year before the issue. This figure reports the fraction of straight debt and convertible issues with call provisions (top panel) and the fraction of straight debt and convertible issues that are callable within three years of issuance (bottom panel). Table I for a description of many of the independent variables. In the regression analyses, the convertible arbitrage industry variable is measured in 100 billion of U.S. dollars. Log of years to maturity is the logarithm of the number of years between issuance and maturity. Log of offering proceeds is the logarithm of the gross proceeds in thousands of dollars. Log of total sales is the logarithm of the issuer's total sales in millions of dollars in the financial year preceding the issue as reported in Compustat. The floating rate measure is a dummy equal to one if the convertible pays a floating coupon rate, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Callable within three years of issuance (1 Table I and III for a description of the independent variables. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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